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Severance Pay, Pensions, and 'fficient Mobility
ABSTRACT
This paper argues that pensions are used as severance pay devices in an
efficient compensation scheme. The major points of the study are:(1)
Severance pay, which takes the form of higher pension values for early
retirement, is widespread.(2) A major reason for the existence of pensions
is the desire to provide an incentive mechanism that can also function as an
efficient severance pay device. It is incorrect to think of pensions merely
as a tax—deferred savings account.(3) The wage rates that older workers
receive exceed their marginal products. This is evidenced by the fact that
employers are willing to buy them out with higher pensions if they retire
early.
These conclusions are based upon examination of a data set which was
generated as part of this study. That data set contains detailed information
on 244 of the largest pension plans in the country, covering about 8 million
workers.
Edward P. Lazear






Itis often suggested that severance pay is not a common feature of labor
contractseven though theory dictates its usage in a number of
circumstances.1 Sometimes in the same breath, the widespread nature of
pension arrangements are noted without providing much justification forthis
"forced savings"which operates through the firm. This paper providesa
theoretical argument and evidence from pension plans covering approximately
8.4 million workers that pension plans are incentive—based severance pay
devices which bring about efficient mobility and effort in the labor market.
The major points of the study are:
1.) Severance pay, which takes the form of higher pension values for
early retirement, is widespread.
2.) The age—earnings profile is significantly steeper than the age—
productivity profile. This is the direct implication of the firm's offer to
buy workers out with higher pension benefits if they retire early.
3.) Pensions cannot be thought of simply as an asset for retirement in
the same way that one thinks of a savings account. Thereis an important
incentive—severancepay aspect to pension and this feature may be the most
important reason why "forced savings" through pensions are widespread.
II. The Model
Long—term labor contracts may create problems for separation
efficiency. For example, as I have argued elsewhere (Lazear 1979, 1981) the
incentives generated by an upward sloping age—earnings profile often make
steep profiles preferred even if productivity does not rise over the hf e—
cycle. A steeper profile induces more effort because the worker is reluctant
to shirk for fear that he may lose his job which offers future rewards that4
far exceedhisalternatives (see Becker and Stigler (1974)). When the
earnings profile deviates from the productivity profile, mobilitydecisions
(and labor supply considerations in general) are distorted. Severance pay can
eliminate much of the distortion.
The basic pointis this: If wages exceed marginal product,then the firm
has an incentiveto buy out of the contract by paying the worker an amountto
leave early. The amount that the firm is willing to pay measures the differ-
ence between the future wage commitment and future marginal product. If the
firmoffers that amount to the worker, the worker will accept the buyout only
when his alternativesaresufficiently good——in fact, itturnsout, only when








The worker's productivity at the current firm is V andW is the
value of the alternative use of time. The date of efficient retirement, where
W =V,is T. The actual wage profile is W; it has the same present value
as V ,butis steeper and includes a pension between T and T' •Itis the
deviation between W and V that generates incentives and simultaneously
creates the problem that severance pay reduces.
Suppose, for example, that at time t0 a worker receives a wage offer
from another firm of W where V < W < W .Efficiencyrequires that the
worker leave, since there are side payments that could be made which make all
parties better off if the worker moves to the new firm. However, in the
absence of any side payments, the worker opts to remain since W exceeds
1q*fromt0 to T
A severance pay arrangement can bring about efficiency in this situation.
Since the present value of W equals the present value of V (for a zero—
prof it equilibrium), the firm "owes" the worker the present value of ABCD
plus EFGH ,(hereafterjust "ABCD" and "EFGH.") Offering the worker this
amount as severance pay induces efficient mobility. What the worker receives
from quitting is (T —t0)W*+ (ABCD) + (EFGH). If he stays, he receives
W(t) from t0 to T plus area EFGH, or (T —t0)V+ (ABCD) + (EFGH). What
he earns if he quits always exceeds what he receives if he stays if and only
if W > V which is the condition for efficient mobility.
Pensions may serve as severance pay. This requires that the expected
present value of the pension at t0 be (ABCD) plus (EFGH), or in general, the
expected value of the pension for retirement at t is (in time zero dollars)
T T'
(1) P(t) =f[W(t)—V(r)]erTd + 5W(r)ertdt
t T6
It is obvious from (1) that the expected present value of the pension must
first increase with t until t =tand then decline in order for pensions
to act as an efficient severance pay device. This counterintuitive implica-
tion is the result of using a pension as an efficient form of severance pay.
If pensions were merely a tax advantageous savings account, this pattern would
not be expected.
In addition to the possibility that the worker receives an exogenous wage
offer of w* > V ,thereis also the possibility that V is unexpectedly low,
as the result of an unanticipated worker illness, for example. Again, with
reference to figure 1, suppose that marginal product fell to V at time to.
It is efficient for the worker to quit since there is some set of side
payments which could make all parties concerned better off. Awarding the
employerthe right to terminate a worker without cause at any time as long as
the firm pays the appropriate severance pay will restoreefficiency, and will
not require any verification that V isin fact below W .However,itwill
requireseverance pay greater than the amount described by P(t) in (1).
A scheme which induces the firm to behave appropriately requires that
severance pay C(t)is paid when the worker is terminated "without cause."




At t0 ,C(t)equals (JBCD) +(EFGH).This rule always induces efficient
layoff behavior. The cost to the firm at time t0 of keeping the worker net
of output is w(t) from t0 to T plus area EFGH or
T
fW(t)edr+Area(JBCD) +Area(EFGH)
* —rT —fV (r)edi
to
to7
The costofterminating the worker with severance pay C(t) is Area (JBCD) +
Area(EFGH). It is clear that it is cheaper to lay the worker off with
severance pay if and only if
T — * —rT f( W(r)—V(r) )edi > 0
t
0
which is the efficiency condition.2
Note first that when the firm lays off the worker severance pay is higher
than when the worker resigns voluntarily. This is simply the result of the
difference between V and W so that the worker's gains are not equal to the
firms losses. It implies, however, that as t approaches T ,thedifference
between the benefit that the worker receives from early retirement at his
election and that received when he retires with "consent" of the employer,
i.e., the employer wishes himtoleave, shrinks to zero (because V —W
shrinks to zero)
Although severance pay associated with employer—initiated separation is
well—defined conceptually, it may be difficult to use in practice for two
reasons:
First,termination "without cause" is not an unambiguous term.Recall
thatamajor reason for the upward sloping age—earnings profile is that such a
profileimposes large costs on workers who shirk and are terminated as the
result.Workers do not receive severance pay C(t) if they are fired for
shirking,but they do ifthey are terminated "withoutcause." This creates a
sourceof disagreement between worker and firm. (ERISA [1974) is the
outgrowth of many such disputes.)4
The second reason is more compelling. Since C(t) >P(t),the worker
prefers that a given separation is initiated by the employer while the8
employer prefers that it is initiated by the worker. Thus, a worker who finds
*
w> V can gain by inducing the firm to terminate him. In fact, since C(t)
*
>P(t), there are even some values of W < V for which workers prefer to be
laid off. If V > > W, the worker would be unwilling to initiate a separ-
ation, but prefers that the employer does relative to work. This encourages
shirking and other malfeasant behavior which assists in bringing it about. A
similar argument can be made on the other side. The firm sometimes prefers
that the worker quit and may make work conditions correspondingly miserable.
Neither of these situations is efficient. The rule C(t) =P(t)avoids any
of these difficulties.
If severance pay arrangements are efficient, then the value of the
severance pay provides us with an estimate of the difference between wages and
marginal product. Stated intuitively, employers are only willing to buy out
of the commitment if they lose by retaining the workers. Only when W > V is
the employer anxious to buy out and his anxiety increases as the difference
between W and V increases. Thus, in figure 1, if the pension value of
retiring at T is EFGH and at t0 is ABCD plus EFGH ,thenthe
difference, ABCD ,measuresthe difference between wages and marginal product
between t0 and T •Sincew(t) and P(t) are observed, V(t) can be
estimated so that we can determine, at least for those near retirement years,
the relationship between wages and marginal product.
Similarly, if one computes the pension benefits paid at the employer's
election, one can obtain an estimate of the W(t) or reservtion wage
profile.W(t) and V(t) should converge at normal (or mandatory)
retirement if that date is chosen efficiently.
These issues are now treated more formally. First consider pension
benefits that can be received at the worker's election, even without "consent"9
of the employer. This corresponds to the present value of the difference
between W(t) and V(t).
An efficient severance pay rule says that at time t,theworker will
quit and take severance pay if and only if W(t) ,thealternative use of
time (now a random variable) exceeds V(t) .Utilitymaximization implies
that a worker quits and accepts severance pay if two conditions hold: (1) the
present value of severance pay plus the alternative stream exceeds the present
value of the wage stream in the current firm and (2) the worker cannot do even
better by delaying his retirement to some time in the future.5
Let us make periods and wage changes discrete. Consider period T —1,





r=O (l+r) r=O (l+r)
where KT' —T,St is the annual pension payment received from t until
death at T' if the worker retires at t ,Wis the alternative wage paid
between t and t÷l and W is the wage at the current firm between t
and t÷l.
To induce efficient quitting behavior, it is necessary that the i.h.s. of







t=O (i-I-r) t=O (l+r)
choose T and T—1 so that
rr..l —( iE = WT1 -
VT_i
Substitution of (4) into (3) yields the necessary and sufficient condition
that the worker quits if10




Since this is the efficiency condition, the severance pay arrangement results
in efficient turnover.
Now consider the decision at T—2 •Theworkerresigns at T —2if and
only if two conditions hold: First, the present value of retiring at T—2
and receiving severance pay must exceed the present value of continuing to
work until T—l and retiring then, taking the T—1 severance pay. Second,
the present value of retiring at T—2 with severance pay must exceed the
present value of working until T and taking the normal pension. If we make
the assumption that > V implies W, > V,for t' > t then the
second condition becomes redundant (demonstrated below). Consider the first
condition: A worker retires at T—2 rather than at T—1 if f
E (W ) K+2 E (W ) S K+l
(6) w÷T—2 T-l+s
1 > w ÷T—2 T-l÷T—l 1
T—2 1 +r T—2T=0 (l+r1
T—2 1 +r 1+r
't=O (l+r)t
where ET1(WT1) is the expectation of the alternative wage offer at T —1
given the information at T -2(W is then E0(W)).
For efficiency, it is necessary that the l.h.s. of (6) exceed the r.h.s.
of (6) iff WT2 < VT2 (which, by assumption, implies WT_l < VT1).












To see this, substitute (7) into (6). The worker opts to leave if f
w+w -V>W
T-2 T—2 T—2 T—2
(8) or
if WT2 > VT2
which is the efficiency condition.
Note also that if WT2 > VT2 the worker chooses retirement at T—2
over retirement at T. The second condition is redundant. Since
> V implies WT1 > ,theefficient pension plan already
insures that inequality (5) holds as well. That is, since the efficient
pension at T-1 induced retirement at T—1 whenever WT1 > VT_li it is
clear that retirement at T-2 dominates retirement at T because it
dominates the superior strategy, namely, retirement at T—l.
This provides a general statement of the efficient pension:
(9)p -P=W —V















The terminal value, T' is exogenous to thisproblem. Itmight be thought
ofas the optimal pension to prevent shirking in the final period before
retirement.12
It is through equations (9) and (10) that we derive ourresults.If the
wages of old workers (t—i > tinfig. 1) exceed their marginal products,
then the present value of the pension falls as the age of retirement rises
(eq. (9)). Similarly, eq. (9) provides us with an estimate of the difference
between W and V at each point in time because Tj and T-i+1 are
observed.
The point of this section can be restated: The pension which acts as
severance pay reduces the true wage to V when we take into account the way
that the pension value falls with experience. Since the pension is riot paid
if the separation is punishment for too little effort, incentives are
maintained while efficient turnover is produced.
Below we discuss the role of vesting in this context. But before doing
that, we derive some additional formulas. Letusspecify the efficient C(t)
path, i.e., that path that induces the employer to lay the workers off if and
only if V < ,whereV is now a random variable.





i C — 1 i—i r
(12) CT_i = C WTT—WTT] i ) +
T1 (1+r)
where CT =Tsince WT =VT
•Thispath induces employers to separate
workers "without cause," if and only if V < W
The case of postponed retirement is equivalent. In fact, normal
retirement is riot sacred once we allow pension benefits to vary with the date
of retirement. The date of "normal retirement" is the date of modal13
retirement. In almost all cases that age is 65 and corresponds to the start
ofsocial security payments. The reason is thatthe social security earnings
testcausesthe W(t) function to take a discrete jump upwards at age 65.
Therefore, from the point of view of efficiency, most workers find that W(t)
intersects V(t) at T •IfH is the amountofsocial security payment,
then all of those individuals whose alternative value of time at T without
social security included lies between V and V-H find that there
alternative use of time rises above V at P
Except for this detail, the analysis of postponed retirement is similar.
A worker should continue to work if and only if W(T) > V(T) •Thisis the
same condition (5). The worker's choice is still reflected by (3) so all
holds as above with a replacement of subscripts. If j is the number of
years after "normal retirement" then retirement occurs if f:
K—j 1 ST+j÷l K—(j+l) 1t
(3')W +S I >w+ z
T+j T+j 1+r T+j l+r l+r
Eqs. (9), (9') and (10) follow accordingly so that an estimate of W—V can be
obtained for those years after T as well by examining the way in which
pension benefits decline in late retirement.
Let us summarize this section. Employers are willing to buy out of a
long term contract if the wage rate exceeds VMP. The amount that employers
are willing to pay reveals something about the difference between W and V.
Pensions may act as a buyout. If the value of the pension declines with the
age of retirement, this suggests that the pension plays the role of severance
pay. By examining the way in which pension benefits move with age of
retirement, one can infer something about the difference between W and V.14
Vesting
It is useful to consider the way that vesting affects the analysis. When
a worker's pension is vested, he carries with him the rights to any accrued
pension benefits. Vesting creates no difficulties for worker-initiated
separation since the efficiency of pensions as severance pay is based on the
assumption that the worker receives the value Pt if he leaves at t. The
difficulty arises in the attempt to use pensions as both severance pay device
and incentive provider. If a law such as ERISA requires vesting of pensions,
then a firm which previously used pensions as a reward for service well done
has that tool nullified. The reaction may take a number of forms. bst
extreme is that pensions are not used at all for this purpose. Instead,
deferred compensation in the form of even steeper wage growth can be used.
This is less desirable than wage growth with pension because it creates too
little turnover and does not solve the final period problem efficiently. A
less extreme adjustment is that the value of the pension can be made more
highly contingent upon final salary. The firm can then reduce wage growth for
shirkers which will decrease the value of the pension accordingly. Finally,
the firm can opt to violate the law. If the probability of that occurring
decreases in worker effort, incentives may still be maintained, although to a
lesser extent.
This raises other issues. "Vesting" is not an especially meaningful term
once it is recognized that the pension benefit formula can be altered.
Vesting states that a worker is entitled to accrued benefit even if he leaves,
but accrued benefits may be very small until the final years before retire-
ment. There are a number of reasons: First, if the benefit formula depends
upon final salary, the benefit received by a worker who leaves at age 30 may
be much smaller than if he leaves at age 60 because salary grows with age, and15
in an inflationary economy, with time. Second, since length of service
affects benefits, formulas can be specified to make accrual rates a convex
functionof years of service, placing a premium onlong tenure. Third, early
retirementrestrictions normally prevent a worker from taking retirement
beforean age around 55. A worker who is "vested,"butbelowthat age
receivesa promise of benefits at 65. This is generally lessvaluable than
theright tostart receiving benefits at 55 whichhe enjoys ifheremains with
thefirm until that age.6
A final point is that the tendency of many plans to tie benefits to final
salary rather than a career average may be evidence for the incentive role of
pensions.If insurance or savings were the motive, then tying pensions to
permanent income is more likely to be warranted and acareer average is a
betterproxy for permanent income than is final salary. Final salary,
however,can be adjusted to reflect worker effort and hours worked. The
multiplier effect on pension value may create significant incentives for
workersto maintain effort and labor supply during those final years.
InefficientRetention and Inefficient Separation
Thereremains thepossibility that the worker will not leave the firm
whenit is efficient for himtodo soand that he will separate when separa-
tion is inefficient. This results when both V and Ware random variables
—*—*—
simultaneously.For example, let V > W > V > W. V >W implies that the
employer will not initiate a separation. V > W implies that a worker will
-*
not initiate a separation. W > Vimplies that a separation is efficient.
This inefficient retention can be eliminated by lowering C(t) to P(t).
Thenthe employer will initiate a separation whenever V* < V. The difficulty
is that settingC(t) =P(t)creates some additional inefficient separation
* -
atthe same time. For example, if V > V > W > W, a separation that would16
not have occurred with C(t) > P(t) does when C(t) =P(t),yet this separa—
*-
tionis inefficient since V > W. Note that even C(t) > P(t) does not
—* * —
eliminateall inefficient separation. Suppose W > V > W. V < W implies
that the employer terminates the worker, but this termination is inefficient
-* *
sinceW < V .Analogously,inefficient quitting occurs when V > W > V.
Since W > V, the worker quits and receives P(t). This quit is inefficient
*
sinceV > W. Elsewhere (Hall and Lazear [1982]), the tradeoff between
inefficient separation and inefficient retention is analyzed in depth. These
simple rules cannot, in general, eliminate all inefficiencies, and more
complex rules suffer from other difficulties.
HumanCapital
The theory of specific human capital, through its sharing arrangement
(seeBecker (1964)) impliesW <V for older workers. This pattern is the
reverseof that shown in Figure 1. It also has different implications.
First it implies that employers prefer that employees work beyond the
date at which the worker chooses to retire. Since V > W ,theworker chooses
to retire when =
Win the absence of other incentives. This occurs
before =V,the condition that determines efficient date of retire-
ment. Since V > W ,theemployer prefers that the worker continue to work so
that there is no mandatory retirement.
Second, if specific human capital were important pensions would be
unlikely to decline with increases in retirement age. This encourages more
quitting by workers. But when specific human capital is important so that the
wage is below the value of the worker to the firm, the problem is that there
is already too much quitting. (In the absence of offer-matching, an outside
wage offer between W and V generates a quit even though quitting is
inefficient •)17
Empirical Analysis
The data for this analysis were constructed using the Banker's Trust 1975
Study of Corporate Pension Plans. This book contains detailed verbal
descriptions of 271 pension plans from 190 of the largest companies in the
United States. These plans cover about 8.4 million workers or about 25% of
all workers covered by private pension plans.
The major empirical task was to convert the verbal descriptions into
machine readable data. After that was done, it was necessary to write a
program which would calculate the appropriate expected present values using
these data. A summary of the approach follows.
Pension benefit formulas take three basic forms. The simplest form,
sometimes called the pattern plan, awards the recipient a flat dollar amount
per year worked upon retirement. The more "conventional" type, calculates
pension benefits from a formula which depends upon years of service and some
average salary. Finally, a "defined contribution" plan awards pension
benefits which vary depending upon the value of market securities. Here, each
year a certain amount is put into some investment fund on the employee's
behalf. The value of the pension depends upon the performance of that fund.
Given these formulas, the first task is to calculate normal retirement
benefits that are available to the worker if he retires at the normal
retirement age. This involves taking into account the type of plan the
individual has as well as his salary and tenure.
In addition to calculating normal retirement benefits, also calculated
are retirement benefits that accrue to individuals who retire from one to
fifteen years before the date of normal retirement, if that was permitted, and
for those who retire from one to fifteen years after the date of normal
retirement, also if permitted by the conditions of the plan.18
There are no individuals in this sample, per Se. This data set is a
description of pension plans so what is reported in this empirical section are
the results of a simulation exercise. For each pension plan, I created twelve
employees, having all combinations of tenure upon normal retirement of 10, 20,
and 30 years and salary upon normal retirement of $9000, $15,000, $25,000 and
$50,000. The analysis described below relates to these 2,928 hypothetical
individuals from 244 pension plans. (Only 244 of the plans had complete and
clean information.)
It is important to note that calculating retirement benefits at each age
of retirement is not a straightforward task. Most plans have many restric-
tions on the maximum amount which can be accrued and many provide for
supplemental benefits if early retirement is taken. Also, a large number of
plans reduce pension benefits once social security eligibility age is
reached. These restrictions and supplements are incorporated into the
program. Additional restrictions have to do with vesting requirements,
maximum age at which the individual begins employment, minimum numbers of
years served before particular supplements are applicable, and restrictions on
years during which supplements may be applied. In calculating retirement
benefits, assumptions about wage growth are crucial. Since it is nominal wage
growth that is relevant, I examined the CPS data from 1974 and 1976 to infer
what a synthetic cohort age 55—63, in 1974, would earn as individuals 57—65
years old in 1976. As is known by most labor economists, earnings growth for
older individuals is negative, not positive, and this sample was no exception
to that rule. For the sample of males working "full time" in both years,
average nominal wage growth during that period was —2%. For those who were
full time in 1974 and full or part time in 1976, the rate was —13%. Most of
this reduction in observed earnings reflects reduction in hours worked by19
these individuals, often as the result of illness. However, it is the annual
earnings figure that is relevant for calculating pension benef its.7 In order
to be conservative, it was assumed that the wage growth rate was zero, rather
than negative. My assumption tends to increase the value of normal retirement
benefits relative to early retirement benefits, and so, understates the amount
by which the expected present value of pension benefits declines as one
postpones retirement. Additionally, the entire analysis was performed with an
earnings growth rate equal to +5%. This reduced the magnitude, but not affect
the direction of the results reported below.
In order to calculate present values, an assumption about interest rates
must be made and a particular mortality table must be chosen. I assumed that
the interest rate was 10% and I used the life tables for Americans in 1975.
It is important to point out that it is not clear that this is the appropriate
life table. Early retirees may have different life expectancies than normal
retirees. The most obvious reason is that early retirees may retire early
because they are less healthy. If so, their life expectancy would be
shorter. These calculations would then overstate the amount by which pension
benefits decline as retirement age is postponed.
Findings
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics. The mean of the expected
present value of pension benefits taken at normal retirement age is $51,209
for those "workers't in our sample. But the variation is tremendous. The
standard deviation is $53,282 with a maximum value of $412,970 and a minimum
value of $398. Part of this is due to variation in salary and tenure
status. But even within each salary and tenure group, the variation in
benefits across companies is enormous. Within each group the maximum value is
about three times the mean, the minimum is about one—fifth of the mean, and20
the standard deviations go from about 30% to about 60% of the mean as salary
and tenure increase.
The most important findings relate to the way that the expected present
value of pension benefits vary with the date of retirement. Table 2 reports
the means of expected present value of pension benefits upon retirement from
10 years before normal age to 10 years after normal age for that sample of
simulated individuals who were eligible for some pension benefits in all of
those situations. In Table 2, EPV—10 is the expected present value of
retirement at 10 years before the normal age; EPVO is the expected present
value at normal age; and EPV+10 is the expected present value at 10 years
after normal age. All other numbers correspond. The table is broken down by
salary and tenure category so that the averages reflect averages across
pension plans for individuals of a given type, rather than averages across all
individuals. The plans are also broken down into the three basic types:
pattern, or defined flat benefit plans; conventional, or defined formula
benefit plans; and defined contribution plans. Table 2 contains only
individuals having 20 or 30 years of tenure since those with 10 years of
tenure at age of normal retirement would not be eligible for early retirement
10 years prior. For ease of inspection, Table 2 also reports the ratio of
expected present value in a particular year to expected present value of
pension benefits if retirement occurs at the normal age. This is listed as
ERAT—10—ERAT+10 in the table.
Two important points are obvious upon inspection. First, most workers
receive pensions, the expected present value of which declines as retirement
is postponed. The exception to this is individuals who are on defined
contribution plans. They are relatively rare, amounting to approximately
500,000 of the 8.4 million workers in the Banker's Trust sample.21
This evidence suggests that firmsattemptto buy old workers out of their
long—term arrangements. This is consistent with the notion that pensions are
used as a severance pay device to induce workers to leave early if it is
efficient for them to do so. Further, most pension plans have this feature,
the exception being plans of the defined contribution type.
This evidence also suggests that pensions cannot be viewed simply as a
tax free savings account. That view is inconsistent with the finding that
most pensions lose value as the worker works beyond a certain point even
though he has withdrawn nothing from the account.8
Finally, using equation 9, we can estimate the difference between the
worker's observed wage rate and his VMP. This is done for the 10 years
preceding normal retirement age and is reported in Table ? as WVDIFF—10 to
WVDIFF— 1.
Note that the size of the wage VMP differential tends to increase with
experience (WVDIFF15 > WVDIFF6), is reasonable in size, and varies with tenure
at normal retirement.
The estimated size of the difference between wage and marginal product
tends to start out negative and become positive. This reflects a wage rate
which is less than marginal product during the early years of the work life
and greater than marginal product in the later years.
The magnitude of the difference between wage and marginal product seems
reasonable as well. For conventional plans, where the pension varies with
salary level, wages exceed marginal product by about 30% in the final year
before normal retirement for individuals with 30 years of tenure. For those
with only twenty years of tenure, that excess is closer to 10% of final
salary.22
Individuals havinq shorter tenure at normal retirement age are workers
who initiated employment with the firm more recently. Those workers are less
likely to have wages which exceed their marginal products. In fact, for those
workers, a significant fraction of the early years have wages below marginal
product as reflected by a negative WVDIFF term. It is also true that the size
of the differential varies with salary as expected. There seems to be a
tendency for those with conventional pension plans, i.e., those with formula
defined benefits, to be more overpaid when old than those with flat defined
benefits or pattern plans. This can be explained. If higher wage workers are
more likely to be doing jobs which are more difficult to monitor, using an
upward age—earnings profile as an incentive mechanism is likely to be more
important for that group.
To the extent that the simulated work force is representative, 92% of
simulated workers had a normal age of retirement equal to 65. Furthermore,
17% of those workers could not defer retirement beyond the age of 65.
As discussed above, the way in which the value of pension benefits
available with employer consent, C, declines with the date of retirement
tells us something about the difference between the wage rate and the
reservation wage. Since the reservation wage must be lower than VMP for a
contract to be efficient, the ratio of the expected present value of retiring
without consent, C,, to expected present value of retiring with consent,
should always be less than one, but should approach one as the individual
approaches normal retirement age. Table 3 selects individuals who have valid
information on benefits received with and without consent. An analysis
similar to that reflected in Table 1 is performed there and the hypothesis is
borne out. CERAT is defined as the ratio of expected present value of
benefits received when retiring without consent to expected present value of23
benefits received when retiring with consent. The number following CERAT
refers to the appropriate year, —10 being 10 years before the normalage of
retirement and —1 being 1 year before the normal age of retirement.Here, it
is universally true that the ratio is less than one so that benefits from
retiring with consent exceeds those from retiring without consent and that
ratio approaches one as one moves toward normal retirement. It should be
pointed out that 68% of the plans do not make any distinction betweensepara—
tioriwithor without employee consent. This is probably because when a
difference exists, each side tries to induce the other to initiate the
separation. Also, that benefits are not much larger when retirement occurs
with consent is not surprising. For retirement to be efficient atT, V(T) =
W(T).Since C(t) —P(t)is a measure of V(T) —(T),this is expected to
be small toward the end of the career.
Additional Results
Although somewhat removed from the main issues of this paper, it seems
useful to investigate the data set further to explore some otheraspects of
pension plans. Since this is among the first comprehensive data sets on
pension plans, it seems useful to examine the relationship between pension
benefits and some characteristics of the firms, workers, and plantypes. This
is easily done by using the simulated data and by summarizing it inregression
form. Table 4 reports some regressions performed on the same simulated data
used to construct Table 1.
The results provide some interesting insight into the major pensionplans
in the United States. First examine column 2. Here, the expectedpresent
value of the pension taken upon normal retirement is regressed on a number of
right hand variables. Each year of additional tenure upon normal retirement
contributes about $2,600 to the value of the pension. Thus, an individual who24
intendedto retire at age 65 would get about $2,600 more for beginning his job
at age 44 than he would if he had begun his job at age 45. Similarly, each
additional dollar of salary at the time of retirement maps into $2.87 in terms
of additional pension benefits. This does not say that pensions trade for
salary at a 2.87 to 1 ratio. The salary is a flow whereas the pension value
is a stock. This says that each additional dollar that an individual can earn
during his last few years of employment tends to bring about almost a $3
increase in pension benefits. Thgain, this is consistent with the interpre-
tation that wages and pensions are an incentive generating mechanism. If
harder working individuals are rewarded with higher wage rates during their
final years on the job, then this also increases the value of their pension
benefits multiplies the cost of shirking.
There seems to be some tendency for larger firms to have more generous
pension benefits. Also formula defined benefit plans are clearly more
lucrative than are flat defined benefit plans. This is true for a given
salary level and it is also true that higher salaried individuals tend to have
the formula rather than the flat defined benefit scheme. Defined contribution
plans seem to be slightly less lucrative if the individual is to retire at the
normal age and significantly less lucrative if he plans to retire early.
However, defined benefit schemes are much better if the individual intends to
remain on the job past the normal retirement date since the present value of
those pension benefits increase with postponed retirement (of. columns 1, 2,
and3 and note the change in sign on FORMULA) •Columns1 and 3 paint a
similar picture.
Incolumn 4,the relationship between the size of early retirement
benefitsand normal retirement benefits is examined. Themost striking
featureis that the longer is tenure at the normalretirement age, the higher25
is the ratio of early retirement benefits to normal retirement benefits.
Firms are more anxious to buy out individuals of a given age who started many
years ago than they are to buy out individuals of that same age who started
more recently. This makes sense. The contract has been negotiated more
recently for individuals with shorter tenure and they are less likely to be
overpaid than their more experienced counterparts of the same age.
Individuals who receive defined benefits, either of the flat or formula
variety, have higher early retirement benefits relative to normal retirement
benefits than those who are part of a defined contribution plan. Since the
expected value of pension benefits does not decline over time for defined
contribution plans in the same way that it does for defined benefit plans,
they are less reasonably viewed as incentive generating devices.
Conclusion
In sum, these data provide support for the view that pensions serve as an
efficient severance pay device. The fact that the expected present value of
pension benefits declines as the individuals postpones retirement suggests
that pensions are not merely a tax—free savings account. If pensions were
merely a tax—free savings account, then it is unlikely that the expected
present value of the pension would decline over the individual's life time.
The fact that pension benefits have a higher value upon early retirement than
upon normal retirement suggests that pensions are an integral part of the
compensation package. Additionally, the estimates suggest that workers
receive wage rates which exceed their marginal products by about 30—35% by the
time they reach retirement. This is consistent with the interpretation that
an important reason for upward sloping age—earnings profile is the provision
of incentives. Finally, the identity of the party who the separation affects
the size of the severance pay, although this practice is not universal.26
Pensions given at the employer's initiative are larger than those given when
employees initiate the separation. This carries with it the implication that
each party will try to induce the other side to initiate the action.27
Table 1
Moments of Expected Present Value
of Normal Retirement Benefits
Group Mean Standard Max Mm N
Deviation
ALL 51209 53282 412970 398 2345
SalaryTenure
9000 10 lO24 3921 29377 1140 192
9000 20 20864 7700 58754 2281 194
9000 30 30403 11411 66055 1601 183
15000 10 16416 7008 43295 398 194
15000 20 31359 14116 82654 797 204
15000 30 47369 20118 116824 1195 186
25000 10 26125 13869 74668 1140 199
25000 20 51337 26328 142550 2281 206
25000 30 76989 39165 201437 3422 188
50000 10 50931 31338 153103 1140 205
50000 20 101462 60683 292287 2281 206
























































































































































SALARY 9000.000 9000.000 15000.000 15000.000 25000.000 25000.000 50000.000 50000.000











































1VDIFF—10 —2713 142 —533
VDIFF—9 —226 219 —452
NVDIO'F—8 —183 296 —380
iVOIFF—7 —123 403 —296
NVDIFF—6 —65 509 —173
1TDIFF—5 18 643 —75
V0IFF—4 108 768 91
NVtIFF—3 208 926 279
NVDIFF—2 297 1033 440
NVDIFF—1 1513 3389 1725























































































































































































































































































SALARY 9000.000 9000.000 15000.000 15000.000 25000.000 25000.000 50000.000 50000.000
TENURE 20.000 30.000 20.000 30.000 20.000 30.000 20.000 30.000
EPV—10 11446 25160 15870 35092 22655 50512 39922 89233
EPV—9 13304 27508 18480 38408 26437 55354 46703 97954
EPV—8 15291 29959 21275 41873 30495 60416 53992 107082
EPV—7 17408 32513 24256 45486 34829 65699 61788 116615
EPV—6 19655 35171 27424 49249 39438 71203 70091 126554
EPV—5 22031 37934 30777 53160 44324 76928 78901 136898
EPV—4 24240 40412 33880 56654 48819 82008 86982 146042
EPV—3 26540 42965 37115 60252 53507 87241 95416 155467
EPV—2 28490 45040 39821 63134 57382 91378 102298 162805
EPV—1 30482 47147 42581 66057 61334 95573 109314 170245
EV0 32514 49284 45396 69021 65361 99824 116462 177783
EPV+1 22158 33054 30938 46292 44544 66951 79369 119237
EPV+2 22194 32622 30987 45685 44615 66074 79496 117675
EPV+3 22111 32059 30871 44897 44449 64934 79200 115644
EPV+4 21909 31364 30589 43925 44042 63528 78475 113140
EPV+5 21587 30541 30140 42771 43396 61859 77324 110169
EPV+6 21149 29592 29529 41443 42515 59938 75755 106747
EPV+7 20598 28524 28759 39947 41407 57775 73781 102895
EPV+8 19939 27345 27839 38295 40082 55386 71417 98640
EPV+9 19177 26062 26775 36499 38551 52787- 68692 94012
EPV+10 18321 24685 25580 34571 36829 49999 65624 89046
ERAT—10 0.353 0.510 0.353 0.510 0.353 0.510 0.353 0.510
ERAT—9 0,411 0.558 0.411 0.558 0.411 0.558 0.411 0.558
ERAT—8 0.472 0.608 0.472 0.608 0.472 0.608 0.472 0.608
ERAT—7 0.537 0.661 0.537 0.661 0.537 0.661 0.537 0.661
ERAT-6 0.607 0,715 0.607 0.715 0.607 0.715 0,607 0.715
ERAT—5 0.680 0.771 0.680 0.771 0.680 0.771 0.680 0.771 AT—4 0.748 0.821 0.748 0.821 0.748 0.821 0.748 0.821
ERAT—3 0.818 0.873 0.818 0.873 0.818 0.873 0.818 0.873
ERAT—2 0.877 0.914 0.877 0.914 0.877 0.914 0.877 0.914
ERAT—1 0.938 0.957 0.938 0.957 0,938 0.957 0.938 0.957
ERAT0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
ERAT+1 0.681 0.670 0.681 0.670 0.681 0.670 0.681 0.670
ERAT+2 0.682 0.661 0.682 0.661 0.682 0.661 0.682 0.661
ERAT4-3 0.680 0.650 0.680 0.650 0.680 0.650 0.680 0.650
ERAT+4 0.673 0.636 0.673 0.636 0,673 0.636 0.673 0.636
RAT-4-5 0.663 0.619 0.663 0.619 0.663 0.619 0.663 0.619
ERAT+6 0.650 0.600 0.650 0.600 0.650 0.600 0.630 0.600
ERAT+7 0.633 0.578 0.633 0.578 0.633 0.578 0.633 0.578
ERAT+B 0.613 0.554 0.613 0.554 0.613 0.554 0.613 0.554
ERAT+9 0.589 0.528 0.589 0.528 0,589 0.528 0.589 0.528
ERAT+10 0.563 0.500 0.563 0.500 0.563 0.500 0.563 0.500
WVDIFF—10 —7167 —904 —1006 —1278 —1458 —1866 —2614 —3362
WDIFS'—9 —342 —1039 —1185 —1469 —1720 —2147 —3091 —3870
VDIFF—8 —987 —1191 —1390 —1685 —2021 —2464 —3636 —4447
WVIF0'—7 —1152 —1364 —1625 —1930 —2365 —2824 —4260 —5100
WVDIFF—6 —1341 —1559 —1892 —2207 —2757 —3231 —4973 —5839
WVOIFS—5 —1371 —1539 —1927 —2169 —2791 —3154 —5017 —5677
WVDIFF—4 —1571 —1743 —2209 —2458 —3201 —3574 —5760 —6437
WVDIFF—3 —1465 —1559 —2032 —2164 —2911 —3107 —5170 —5513
WVIDtFF—2 —1645 —1741 —2281 —2416 —3265 —3466 —5798 —6148
JV0IFT—1 —1847 —1943 —2550 —2694 —3661 —3864 —6497 —6852

















*Benefitsare independent of salary
Conventional Plans
SALARY 9000 9000 15000 15000 25000 25000 50000 50000
TENURE 20 30 20 30 20 30 20 30
CERAT—lO 0.789 0.772 0.815 0.793 0.856 0.838 0.879 0.899
CERAT—9 0.801 0.785 0.825 0.805 0.864 0.847 0.888 0.905
CERAT—8 0.812 0.795 0.835 0.815 0.872 0.856 0.896 0.911
CERAT—7 0.821 0.805 0.843 0.824 0.878 0.863 0.902 0.916
CERAT—6 0.829 0.813 0.850 0.833 0.884 0.870 0.908 0.920
CERAT—5 0.835 0.821 0.856 0.840 0.889 0.876 0.913 0.924
CERAT—4 0.841 0.828 0.863 0.847 0.894 0.882 0.918 0.928
CERAT—3 0.847 0.834 0.869 0.853 9.899 0.887 0.923 0.932
CERAT—2 0.851 0.839 0.873 0.859 0.901 0.892 0.924 0.935
CERAT—1 0.853 0.844 0.874 0.864 0.901 0.896 0.924 0.938
68 77 71 82 72 84 76 84—32—
Table 4
Regressions on Simulated Data
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FOOTNOTES
*
Helpfulcomments by Beth Asch, Fischer Black, Jeremy Bulow, Victor
Fuchs, George Neumann, Robert Willis, and the NBER Pensions and Labor Groups
are gratefully acknowledged. Support was provided by the NBERPensionGrant
and by the National Science Foundation. V. J. Horgan provided valuable
research assistance.
1This issue arises in many recent papers which discuss the relationship
between compensation and efficiency. See for example, Arnott and Stiglitz
(1981), Azariadis (1980), Carmichael (1980), Cooper (1981), Green (1981),
Green and Honkapohja (1981), Grossman and Hart (1981a, b), and Hall and Lazear
(1981).
assumes that V*(to) < V(t0) implies V(t) =V*(to)for t > to
* *
andthat V Ct0) =V(t)implies V Ct) =V(t)for t > to.
3Th1s is consistent with Becker, Landes, and Michael (1977) in that a
separation occurs whenever it is efficient. The severance pay rule is
important, however, because it induces each side to voluntarily and
unilaterally separate only when it is efficient to do so. Landes' (1980)
analysis of alimony relates to this issue in that alimony is severance pay and
efficient alimony would make divorce "efficient." Hall and Lazear (1982)
analyze the issue of efficient severance pay in depth.
4Yet there may be other causes for profiles which are steeper than
productivity. These do not require a distinction between a termination "with
cause" and one "without cause." There, any employer—initiated separation
carries with it payment C(t). Harris and Holinstrom (1982) and loannides and
Pissarides (1980) argue that insurance may be the motive.—34—
5Thatthe entire remaining stream must be examined is recognized in
Fieldsand Mitchell (1981). Bulow (1981) also points out (as my calculations
implictly do) that the "true" current wage also includes the value of changing
the pension as the result of working that period.
6Burkhauser and Quinn (1981) argue a similar point. It has been
suggested that altering the benefit formula can induce "voluntary" retirement
even if mandatory retirement is prohibited.
7One feature of the CPS data may lead to an understatement of wage
growth. Since remaining on the same job is relevant to the calculation of
pension benefits, I restricted by attention in 1976 to individuals who had not
changed occupation or industry during the last two years. Some individuals
who remained within industry and occupation may have changed jobs and their
wage growth is likely to be lower than average.
more sophisticated story is consistent, however. Pensions may also
serve the role of insurance. It can be argued that those who retire early are
the "losers," due to poor health, for example. An arrangement which paid them
more at the expense of those who retire later is consistent with the data. I
have argued elsewhere (Lazear [1979]) that the insurance explanation is
inconsistent with patterns of mandatory retirement across worker types.—35—
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